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Market Structure and Hospital-Insurer bargaining  
in the Netherlands 
 




In  2005,  competition  was  introduced  in  part  of  the  hospital  market  in  the 
Netherlands.  Using  a  unique  dataset  of  transaction  and  list  prices  between 
hospitals and insurers in the years 2005 and 2006, we estimate the influence 
of  buyer  and  seller  concentration  on  the  negotiated  prices  in  the  first  two 
years  after  the  institutional  change.  First,  we  use  a  traditional  Structure 
Conduct Performance  model  (SCP model)  along  the  lines  of  Melnick  et  al. 
(1992) to estimate the effects of buyer and seller concentration on price cost 
margins. Second, we model the interaction between hospitals and insurers in 
the context of a generalized bargaining model (Brooks et al., 1997). In the 
SCP model,  we  obtain  that  the  concentration  of  hospitals  (insurers)  has  a 
significantly positive (negative) impact on the hospital price cost margin. In 
the  bargaining  model,  we  also  find  a  significant  negative  effect  of  insurer 
concentration on the bargaining share of hospital, but no significant effect of 
hospital concentration on the division of the gains from bargaining. In both 
models we find a significant impact of idiosyncratic effects on the market out 
comes, consistent with the fact that the Dutch hospital sector is not yet in a 
long run equilibrium.  
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1.  Introduction  
 
Reforms in the health care sector in OECD countries come in three 'waves'. As 
Cutler (2002) describes, in the first wave, equity (in the form of universal ac 
cess to medical care) rather than efficiency is the most important policy ob 
jective. After a rapid increase in cost, most countries respond in the second 
wave with regulatory limits on costs. Limiting budgets for health care by ra 
tioning access is a primary policy tool to control the cost of health care. The 
increasing dissatisfaction of consumers with rationing leads in the third wave 
to a movement towards more incentive based systems, including competition. 
 
Hospitals represent an important feature of the modern health care provision. 
According to Dranove and Satterthwaite (2000), the number and the size of 
hospitals as essential medical institutions grew since the mid twentieth cen 
tury due to the development of new, effective but expensive therapies. With 
out  a  hospital,  an  individual  doctor  could  not  employ  many  of  new,  often 
capital intensive,  diagnostic  techniques  and  therapeutic  regimes.  Hospitals, 
rather than private offices, were considered to be the workshop of the doc 
tors. Physicians were trusted agents of their patients (see Arrow, 1963) and 
needed workshops. These developments took place mostly in the first wave of 
reforms, which lasted roughly until the 1970s and 1980s, after which hospi 
tals  became  an  important  feature  of  the  health  care  sector  in  most  OECD 
countries.  
 
According to Schut (2003), the current situation in the Netherlands seems to 
be between the second and third phase. Until very recently, cost containment 
was the major issue in the institutional design in the health care sector. In 
2005, competition has been introduced in some segments in the health care 
sector (for example some parts of the hospital care and physiotherapy). The 
Dutch government is also planning to introduce more incentive based mecha 
nisms in the currently regulated domain.  
 
In this paper, we investigate the effects of buyer and seller concentration on 
the price of the unregulated part of the Dutch hospital care in 2005 and 2006. 
We estimate two models describing the interaction between hospitals and in 
surers in determining the negotiated prices. In the first model, we estimate 
the  price cost  margin  as  a  function  of  the  Herfindahl Hirschmann  Indices 
(HHI's) and the market shares of hospitals and insurers. We find that a larger 
supply side concentration leads to significantly higher price cost margins for 
hospitals,  and  that  a  larger  demand side  concentration  has  a  significant 
downward effect on hospital's margins. 
 
In the second model, we define the gains from trade to be divided between 
hospital and insurers as the relative position of the contracted price between 
the estimated average unit cost and the list price. When we regress the bar 
gaining share of the hospital on the concentration and market shares of both 
hospitals and insurers, we find that stronger hospital concentration does not 
lead to a significantly higher bargaining share for hospitals, whereas a larger 
concentration of insurers does have a significant downward effect on the bar 
gaining share for hospitals. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we give some background on 
the  introduction  of  price  competition  between  hospitals  in  the  Netherlands. 
We continue in section 3 with an overview of the literature on the estimation 
of  market  power  and  bilateral  negotiations.  In  section  4,  we  develop  our 
econometric models. We give a description of our dataset in section 5. In sec 
tion  6, we give the  results of the  estimated econometric  models. Section 7 
contains a discussion of our main results. Our results are summarized in the 
appendix. Halbersma, Mikkers, Motchenkova and Seinen     Page 3  5-2-2007 
 
2.  Price competition between hospitals in the Netherlands 
 
The Dutch government plans a step by step introduction of price competition 
between hospitals. The introduction of competition in the Dutch health care 
sector has been  long debated. For a comprehensive overview  of the reform 
process we refer to Helderman et al. (2005). In this section, we will shortly 
describe some of the changes relevant to this paper. 
 
The Dutch reforms are based on a mandatory health insurance system for all 
Dutch citizens combined with a model of managed competition for hospitals 
(Enthoven, 1978). The health insurance system consists of a mandatory com 
prehensive  benefits  package  (including  primary  medical  care  and  hospital 
care,  but  excluding  dental  and  nursing  home  care),  with  virtually  no  co 
payments and an optional deductible. Supplementary insurance policies (e.g. 
for dental and cosmetic care) are optionally available. The mandatory insur 
ance  for  the  basic  benefits  package  ensures  risk  solidarity  and  universal 
health care access for all Dutch citizens  
 
The  mandatory  insurance  is  complemented  by  a  mandatory  acceptance  by 
health insurers of all enrollees, without room for risk selection (i.e. a refusal 
to insure) or price discrimination. A sophisticated risk adjustment system is in 
place  to  compensate  insurance  companies  for  actuarially  predictable  health 
expenditure differentials induced by socio demographic factors, such as age, 
sex, income, location and prior health care consumption (chronic pharmaceu 
tical dependencies and prior hospitalization). The risk adjustment system lev 
els the playing field for health insurers by enabling price competition on the 
premium rates (see Schut and Van de Ven, 2005).  
 
The basic idea behind these reforms is that health insurers will start 'manag 
ing competition' between health care providers by negotiating price discounts 
from a selectively contracted network of health care providers. In this way, 
insurers can compete for enrollees by offering health plans that are both at 
tractively priced, but still give a reasonably broad choice of health care pro 
viders.  
 
Two reports by the Dutch Health Care Regulator (CTG/ZAio, 2005 and 2006) 
monitoring the competitive hospital segment, however, indicated that selec 
tive contracting of hospitals has been virtually non existent since most insur 
ers  haven  been  contracting  almost  every  hospital.  Two  other  characteristic 
features of managed care in the United States, such as utilization review and 
patient steering by health insurers are also still in their infancy in the Dutch 
health care system. 
 
Annual  health  care  expenditures  (excluding  long term  care)  in  the  Nether 
lands for 2005 and 2006 amounted to approximately €2,000 per capita, half 
of which were funded by payroll taxes, the other half being funded by the in 
surance premiums. Almost half of the health care expenditures was on hospi 
tal care. Because of the large share of hospital care in total health care ex 
penditure, the effects of the introduced competition on prices in the hospital 
care contracting market are of great interests to policy makers trying to cre 
ate a more effective health care system.  
 
In this paper, we will study the impact of both hospital and insurer concentra 
tion and market shares on Dutch hospital prices in the competitive segment. 
Since measures of concentration or market share require a market definition, 
we have to define the relevant market (as in anti trust cases). The relevant 
market consists of a geographic dimension and a product dimension. We de 
lineate  the  local  geographic  markets  for  hospital  care  using  the  Elzinga 
Hogarty  test  using  patient  flow  data.
4  The  average  local  hospital  market  is 
strongly concentrated with an average HHI of 2,350. 
 
Defining the geographic market for health insurers is more complicated, since 
they compete for clients in a national market, whereas the contracting with 
hospitals is more localized. In the FTC/DOJ (2004) report, for instance, it is 
                                                       
4 The method of defining relevant markets for health care markets is not undisputed. See, for 
example, Gaynor and Vogt (2000).  
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mentioned that the relevant market for insurance companies in no larger than 
the local areas within which the enrollees live or work, because patients gen 
erally  prefer  to  receive  treatment  from  providers  close  to  the  place  where 
they live or work.  
 
In this paper, we therefore assume the relevant market for health insurers to 
be identical to hospital market. If we use the definition of the relevant hospi 
tal markets as the relevant market for insurance companies, we notice that 
the local health insurance markets are even stronger concentrated than the 
hospital markets: all HHI's for the insurance markets are above 2,000, with 
an average of 4,500. The concentration can be explained by the historically 
assigned  regional  legal  monopoly  positions  of  the  local  health  plans  (these 
monopolistic legal predecessors of the current health insurers were abolished 
in 1992, but their remnants nevertheless still prevail to a large extent). 
 
The relevant product market can be defined as the set of all hospital products 
in the competitive segment. As in most OECD countries, a product and treat 
ment classification is in place in the Netherlands. In 2005, a system of diag 
noses  treatment  combinations  (“DBC”)  was  introduced  as  a  simultaneous 
product  and  treatment  structure. A DBC  'includes all activities and  services 
and treatments associated with a patients demand for care from initial con 
sultation or examination to final check up' (Schut and Van de Ven, 2005). In 
total approximately 100.000 DBC’s  have  been  developed,  of  which  approxi 
mately 33.000 DBC’s are used in practice.
5  
 
Since 2005, prices are not regulated anymore for a competitive segment of 
uncomplicated, elective outpatient care. This competitive segment consists of 
1,376 different DBC’s. Since  some DBC’s  are  almost identical,  the group  of 
DBC’s in the competitive segment can be clustered to 145 different products 
(CTG/ZAio, 2005). The DBC’s in the competitive segment cover 15 (out of 24) 
different specialisms and belong to 28 different diagnoses. See figure 3 in the 
appendix for an overview of the most frequently performed procedures in the 
competitive segment. 
 
                   [Figure 3 about here] 
 
The  revenue  of  the  competitive  segment  is  approximately  1.1  billion  Euro, 
which is about 8% of the total expenses on hospital care in the Netherlands. 
To eliminate the revenue associated with the competitive segment from the 
prospective budgets for the regulated segment, the Dutch Healthcare Author 
ity estimated cost prices (i.e. average unit cost) for the products, based on a 
survey of a group of 12 hospitals and multiplied these cost prices with the es 
timated volumes (see further in section 5). 
 
Apart from hospitals, there are also so called Independent Treatment Centers 
(ZBC’s) active in the market for hospital care. These ZBC's are small outpa 
tient treatment centers which where allowed to enter the market from 1998. 
However, ZBC's are only allowed to provide treatments that do not require an 
overnight stay in the hospitals. In recent years, the proliferation in the num 
ber  of  ZBC's  has  been  in  contrast  to  the  steady  concentration  of  hospitals 
(see Figures 1 and 2 of the appendix).  
 
          [Figure 1 about here]  [Figure 2 about here] 
 
Since ZBC's contract with insurers at considerably lower prices than hospitals 
(average ZBC prices are approximately 20 lower than hospital prices), the po 
tential competitive constraint of ZBC's appears to be considerable. However, 
the total revenue of the entering ZBC's is only a few percent of the market 
(NZa, 2006). The prevalent reason behind this low prices and low volumes is 
that most ZBC's were established as subsidiary branches of hospitals (often 
on the same premises), allowing the latter to circumvent the rationing regime 
in the regulated domain by shifting production towards ZBC's (which are ex 
empt from the budget regime). Effectively, most ZBC's therefore exercise lit 
tle competitive constraint on the incumbent hospitals. Finally, we only posses 
price  from  ZBC's  in  2006.  In  the  remainder  of  this  paper,  we  will  exclude 
ZBC's from our analysis. 
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The institutional design of the hospital market in the Netherlands described 
above is in many ways similar to that in the United States.
6 There are how 
ever some important differences. First, U.S. citizens are not obliged to have a 
health insurance and, second, U.S. insurers do not have a mandatory accep 
tance for any patient at community rating. Finally, almost the entire hospital 
sector (at least for privately insured patients) has been without direct price 
regulation for several decades. The stakes in bargaining between insurers and 
hospitals  are  therefore  currently  far  greater  in  the  US  than  in  the  Nether 
lands, and US market parties have had more time than their Dutch counter 
parts to reach a long run equilibrium.  
3.  Literature review 
 
There is a large amount of literature on the impact of buyer and seller concentra 
tion in health care markets. For good reviews see e.g. Dranove and Satterthwaite 
(2000) and Gaynor and Vogt (2000). Most of the previous literature is concerned 
with the exercise of market power on only one side of the market: either insurers’ 
monopsony power or hospitals’ monopoly power. Most studies follow the struc 
ture conduct performance (SCP) tradition and estimate a reduced form model 
in which price or margins are regressed on control variables (mostly cost and 
demand shifters) and a measure of either buyer or seller concentration.  
 
However,  to  identify  the  effects  of  buyer  (seller)  concentration  with  mo 
nopsony (monopoly) power, specification of an underlying structural model is 
required.  The  new  empirical  industrial  organisation  (NEIO)  models  provide 
such accurate and direct measures of market power, but the high standards 
imposed  on  the  available  data  and  estimation  methods  can  often  prevent 
clean tests of these models. For example, in competitive markets, price is ex 
ogenous but in markets with monopoly (monospony) power, price is endoge 
nous and has to be instrumented for, e.g. with demand and cost shifters. Fur 
thermore, the proper indentification of the conduct parameter related to mo 
nopoly (monopsony) power requires a demand (supply) rotator such as the 
price of an outside good (or factor prices in outside industries) in order to in 
strument for the marginal demand (supply) appearing in the pricing equation 
(Bresnahan,  1989).  These  requirements  are  often  not  fulfilled  by  the  data 
used in most studies. 
 
There is a large literature on the unilateral impact of buyer concentration on hospi 
tal  prices.  Examples  are  Feldman  and  Greenberg  (1981),  Adamache  and  Sloan 
(1983), Frech (1988), and Foreman et al. (1996). These studies analyze the rela 
tionship between the market share of Blue Cross/Blue Shield and the hospital dis 
counts  from  list  prices.  All  find  positive  relationships  between  Blue  Cross/Blue 
Shield share and provider discounts. However, Staten et al. (1987, 1988) find no 
significant relationship between these variables. Melnick et al. (1992) attribute the 
insignificant results of Staten et al. (1987, 1988) to the relative inexperience with 
selective contracting of the newly formed Blue Cross Indiana PPO. Using more re 
cent data from the same market, they find a significant negative relation between 
prices and insurers' market share.  
 
As alluded to above, the negative relation between prices and buyers' concentra 
tion as measured by insurers market share is not necessarily an indication of mo 
nopsony power (Gaynor and Vogt, 2000). Issues such as the market definition on 
the buyer's side, endogeneity of insurers' market share with price and the proper 
measurement of transaction prices (as opposed to list prices) have affected most 
studies to date. In summary, the bulk of empirical work has been consistent with 
the exercise of monopsony power by health insurers, but has not tested the mo 
nopsony power hypothesis directly.  
 
There is also a large number of studies assessing the unilateral impact of seller 
concentration  on  hospital  prices.  Examples  are  Noether  (1988),  Melnick  et  al. 
(1992), Dranove et al. (1993), Lynk (1995), Connor et al. (1998), Simpson and 
Shin  (1998),  Dranove  and  Ludwick  (1999),  Keeler  et  al.  (1999),  and  Lynk  and 
Neumann (1999). These studies regress hospital price on measure of seller con 
centration  (usually  a  Herfindahl Hirschmann  index)  and  other  control  variables. 
The vast majority of these studies find that hospital concentration increases prices. 
Again, as with the impact of buyer concentration, the measured positive impact of 
                                                       
6  See  Dranove  and  Satterthwaite  (2000)  for  an  overview  of  the  industrial  organization  of 
health care markets in the U.S. 
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seller concentration on prices has not directly been identified with the exercise of 
monopoly power by hospitals. 
 
Only Staten et al. (1987), Melnick et al. (1992) and Gaynor et al. (2006) analyze 
the bilateral exercise of market power.  However, the first  study focuses  on  the 
concentration  of  insurers  and,  as  discussed  above,  has  some  indeterminate  re 
sults.  Melnick  et  al.  (1992)  focuses  on  the  concentration  of  hospitals.  In  both 
cases, the measurement of the concentration of the other side is not very precise. 
For example, Melnick et al. (1992) use the Blue Cross market share of the hospi 
tal's inpatient days as a measure of insurer concentration, rather than the share of 
Blue Cross in the entire local market. This measure is therefore endogenous with 
hospital price. Gaynor et al. (2006) analyse how both hospitals’ and insurers’ con 
centrations, measured  by  HHIs on  both sides  of  the market,  are  related  to  the 
prices. Their results indicate that increasing concentration of insurers significantly 
decreases price, while the effect of hospital concentration on price is imprecisely 
estimated. 
 
Another stream of literature directly models the bargaining process between insur 
ers and hospitals. Brooks et al. (1997) considers a potential gain from bargaining 
divided by insurers and hospitals, and identifies the exercises of bargaining power 
by both sides. They specify and estimate a cooperative Nash bargaining model of 
hospital insurer bargaining over prices. Their model is inspired by Svejnar (1986), 
a generalization of Harsanyi Nash Zeuthen bargaining model. Brooks et al. re 
port  that  hospitals  have  relatively  more  bargaining  power  (as  indicated  by  the 
magnitude of the estimated bargaining parameter) than insurers. They did not in 
clude a measure of insurers' concentration, although they find that a greater en 
rolment of the population in HMOs has a positive impact on hospital bargaining 
power with respect to fee for service plans. There are some methodological issues 
with the study, however, as the authors do not take into account the censored na 
ture of their dependent variable, raising concerns for the consistency of their esti 
mation results. Furthermore, the model of Brooks et al. (1997), is one of bilateral 
monopoly, rather than a bilateral oligopoly. To the best of our knowledge, for mar 
kets with bilateral market power, there are no well specified generalizations of the 
Nash bargaining model for the bilateral monopoly. This potentially reduces the ap 
plicability of the model of Brooks et al. (1997) to real word healthcare markets. 
Nevertheless, the intuitive results of this paper are very appealing. 
 
Most the studies cited above were either cross sectional or panel studies of indus 
try level  data.  Brooks  et  al.  (1997)  and  Gaynor  et  al.  (2006)  use  patient level 
data. In the more recent literature, consumer choice models have also been em 
ployed to investigate the impact of concentration on prices. Examples are Town 
and Vistnes (2001) and Capps et al. (2003). Town and Vistnes equate a hospital's 
bargaining with the value a hospital adds to a network and find a positive impact 
of bargaining power on prices. Capps et al. (2003) model a similar situation and 
measure each hospital’s market power by an aggregation of consumer’s willing 
ness to pay to the hospital. They find a similar positive link between willingness to 
pay and prices. Such consumer level studies can be used to directly simulate the 
impact on prices following hospital mergers, making these models relevant in anti 
trust cases. 
 
In this paper, we employ a traditional empirical approach in industrial organization 
research:  the  structure conduct performance  (SCP)  approach.  The  idea  is  that 
market  structure  determines  the  conduct  of  firms  and  that  conduct  then  yields 
market performance. As a consequence, our analysis is best thought of as an em 
pirical investigation of the intuitive idea that more concentrated markets have less 
price competition that is reflected in prices (higher for more concentrated sellers, 
lower  for  more  concentrated  buyers).  We  do  not  currently  posses  consumer 
demand data and are limited to aggregate industry data. In the near future, 
we do expect to obtain complete patient level data of the entire Dutch hospi 
tal sector, opening the possibilities to go beyond the reduced form models in 
this paper.  
 
The  contributions  of  this  paper  are  fourfold.  First,  we  analyze  the  effect  of 
both  hospital  concentration  and  insurer  concentration  on  prices  in  a  period 
just after the introduction of price competition in the Netherlands. This pro 
vides  valuable  insights  into  the  workings  of  an  "emerging  market"  where 
market parties have little or no prior experience with bargaining and selective 
contracting.  We  expect  that  Dutch  market  parties  will  exhibit  a  steep  learning 
curve as they adjust their terms over time and become more astute at balancing 
the tradeoffs in their efforts to improve their bargaining strength. As time pro Halbersma, Mikkers, Motchenkova and Seinen     Page 7  5-2-2007 
gresses  and  more  data  becomes  available,  it  will  be  possible  to  model  the 
convergence from short run price dynamics to a long run equilibrium. 
 
Second, we cover a market outside the United States. As far as we know, the 
existing literature has an exclusive focus on competition in the U.S., while we 
focus on the Netherlands. The institutional design of competition in the Neth 
erlands is different from the United States, so that insurers and hospitals op 
erate under more regulation. In the near future, the competitive segment will 
most likely be expanded so that our paper provides a starting point for study 
ing the interaction between competition and regulation in an emerging mar 
ket. 
 
Third, we improve the estimation of both Melnick et al. (1992) and the bar 
gaining  model  based  on  Brooks  et  al.  (1997).  Compared  to  Melnick  et  al. 
(1992), we use an exogenous measure of insurers concentration and incorpo 
rate the effects of buyer and seller concentration in a more symmetric fash 
ion. In the bargaining model, we  improve on the  estimation method by re 
gressing  the  'relative  bargaining  share'  instead  of  the  'absolute  bargaining 
share'  (thereby  correcting  for  heteroskedasticity)  and  by  employing  a  Tobit 
regression rather than OLS (taking into account the censored nature of the 
dependent variable).  
  
Finally,  we  use  a  dataset  that  contains  information  about  both  contracted 
prices (i.e. the actual transaction prices) and the list prices over a number of 
products for a period of two years. To the best of our knowledge, all other 
papers in the literature have either list prices or transaction prices, but not 
both.  
 
4.  Model 
 
4.1 SCP-Model 
SCP models are based on Chamberlin’s (1993) monopolistic competition the 
ory  and  seek  to  explain  firm  performance  through  market  structure  condi 
tions, such as number and size distribution of firms and entry condition in the 
market. The SCP hypothesis explains the performance of firms by the struc 
ture  of  the  market  and  is  based  on  the  premise  that  a  more  concentrated 
market indicates higher market power and consequently higher profits for all 
hospitals in the market. 
 
The basic SCP model can be formulated as follows (where i is a product, firm, 
or time index):  
) 1 ( ) , , ( i i i i C D M f P =  
where P is a performance measure, M a (set of) market structure variables, D 




A number of traditional concentration ratios have been used as market struc 
ture  indices.  The most  common  indicator  is the Hirschman Herfindahl  index 
which gives extra weight to those hospitals that dominate the market. In a 
Cournot model for homogenous products, the HHI is related to the industry 
averaged  price cost  margin  and  buyer  demand  elasticity.  In  SCP models, 
price cost margins are taken from the data and conduct is already determined 
(by the assumption of Cournot behavior), so that the coefficient of the HHI 
coefficient measures the buyer demand elasticity. In structural models aimed 
at  measuring  market  power  directly,  both  price cost  margins  and  conduct 
(i.e. the exercise of market power) are to be estimated. We lack the neces 
sary data to directly estimate the conduct parameter, so that the coefficient 
of HHI can only serve to back up the intuition that higher hospital concentra 
tion leads to higher prices. 
 
The main equation to be estimated on the basis of per hospital, per product 
and per year data is as follows (where h,i and t index hospitals, insurers and 
time): 
) 2 (                           ) ln( ) ln( ) ln(
) (
ln hit h i hi
hit
h hit t d C c D d M s a
p
c p
e + · + + + + =
-
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If we take hospital market  share as the only market  structure variable Mhi, 
then the Cournot oligopoly prediction is s s=1. In case of perfect competition, 
an increase in hospital market share has no impact on performance and s s=0. 
Therefore, in interpreting the coefficient s, we will focus on its sign and sig 
nificance rather than its magnitude.
8 
 
If collusive behavior on the part of sellers exists, then the impact of hospital 
market share on performance is more than proportional and one would expect 
s s>1. An intuitive way to test the hypothesis of coordinated market power (i.e. 
collusion) against the hypothesis of unilateral market power (i.e. bargaining 
power), would be to include both the HHI and the market share in the regres 
sion equation (2). If collusion is the dominant driver behind price cost mar 
gins, one would expect this to be picked by the coefficient of the HHI, since 
even small firms in concentrated market would profit from the collusion. If, 
on  the  other  hand,  firms  only  exercise  their  individual  market  power,  one 
would expect the coefficient of market share to prevail.
9 
 
We therefore include both HHI and market share in our model. To avoid col 
linearity,  we  center  market  shares  around  the  HHI  (since  the  HHI  is  a 
weighted averaged market share). With this linear transformation of our data, 
the coefficient of the centered market share measures the impact of an above 
average market share on market performance and half the difference of the 
coefficients of the HHI and the centered market share measures the impact of 
the market concentration on the price cost margin.  
 
 
4.2  Extension  of  the  SCP-model  to  estimate  effects  of  demand-side 
and supply-side concentration 
 
In this section, we describe the model that can help to identify the effects of 
both buyer and seller concentration on the price of hospital care. We there 
fore  symmetrize  equation  (2)  across  insurers  and  hospitals  by  including 
measures of concentration in both the insurance market and in the hospital 
market in the regression equation (2) described above. The resulting equa 
tion is as follows (where h,i and t index hospitals, insurers and time): 
) 3 ( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln(
) (
ln hit h i i h
hit
h hit t d C c D d M b M s a
p
c p
e + · + + + + + =
-
 
Here the variables Mh and Mi define measures of the market structure of the 
hospitals and insurers in the relevant hospital care market. Di again is a (set 
of)  demand  shifters  (ranging  over  all  insurers),  and  Ch  is  a  set  of  hospital 
product specific control variables (cost shifters).  
 
Our prior hypothesis is that that a higher concentration or market  share of 
hospitals  increases  price  mark up,  while  insurer  concentration  or  market 
share decreases the mark up on prices for hospital care. As in the previous 
section, we include both the HHI and the centered market shares as meas 
ures of concentration. 
 
In Table 3 we provide estimation results for this model. Following Gaynor et 
al. (2006), we like to stress that there is no theoretical consensus on what 
should be a structural model for a bilateral oligopoly. Therefore these kind of 
models are based on the intuition that a higher concentration of hospitals (in 
surers) would lead to higher (lower) prices. 
 
4.3 Hospital-insurer bargaining model 
 
The Svejnar’s (1986) generalization of the Harsanyi Nash Zeuthen bargaining 
model  implies  that  the  potential  gain  from  bargaining  to  be  divided  among 
the players is given by the following expression: 
) 4 ( , ) ( ) (
) ( 1 ) ( Z
j j
Z
i i U U U U V
g g - - - =  
                                                       
8 A similar interpretation of the regression coefficients is employed in Bos (2004), who 
studies the effect of concentration in Dutch banking market on banks’ performance. Bos 
(2004) also provides a formal theoretical model that connects regression coefficient of 
market share (M) to the conjectural variation parameter in Cournot model. 
9 The direct estimation of collusion is not possible with our data set and would also require an underlying 
structural model. To the best of our knowledge, there is no existing literature that directly tests the hypothesis of 
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where  i U  and  j U  define utilities from bargaining to players i and j respec 
tively. Point  ) , ( j i U U  is a disagreement outcome, i.e. utilities for both play 
ers if an agreement is not reached.  ) (Z g  represents bargaining power of the 
player as a function of a set of variables Z, which reflects the set of exoge 
nous characteristics such as market structure. 
 
Brooks et al. (1997) discussed an application of this model to the situation of 
hospital insurer bargaining.  In  their setup,  the  hospital and  insurer bargain 
over a discount from the hospital list price and arrive at a mutually agreed 
transaction price. Both the hospital and the insurer are assumed to be profit 
maximizers. The bargaining outcome is the transaction price that maximizes  
) 5 ( , ) ( ) (
1 g g - P - P P - P = I I H H V  
where 
H P  and 
I P  are the hospital and insurer disagreement profit levels, re 
spectively, and   H H P - P  and  I I P - P   are their corresponding net gains 
from bargaining.  
 
The net profit (gain) of the insurer can be written: 
) 6 ( ), ( ) ( N P K R PN K R T I I - - - - - = P - P
where R is the insurer revenue, K is its cost of production, P is the contracted 
price ,N is the number of patients insured by this insurance company and PT 
is the price the insurer must pay for an episode of inpatient care if the insurer 
has no bargaining power.
10 In our case, this monopoly price is equal to the 
list price.  
 
The net gain of the hospital can be written: 
) 7 ( )], ( [ )] ( [ C P N C P N L H H - - - = P - P  
where C is the average cost per episode of care, P and N are as previously 
defined, and PL the minimum price that the hospital would accept to provide a 
privately insured episode of inpatient care. In our case, this monopsony price 
is equal to the average unit cost. 
 
Substituting equations (6) and (7) into equation (5) and maximizing the re 
sulting equation with respect to P yields: 
) 8 ( . ) 1 ( L T P P P g g - + =
 
From this we see that the negotiated price is a weighted combination of the 
monopoly  and  monopsony  prices, with the bargaining power as the weight. 
We can solve this equation for the bargaining power: 









Note that  L T P P -  is the potential absolute gain (in euro's) from bargaining to 
be  divided  between  the  hospital and  the  insurer, and  L P P-   is  the margin 
gained  by  the  hospital. The  measure of  relative  bargaining  share, γ,  is  the 
share of the potential gain that a hospital keeps as a result of bargaining. If γ 
equals one, the hospital has complete bargaining power. On the other hand, if 
γ equals zero, the insurer has complete bargaining power and is able to ex 
tract a maximum discount from the hospital.   
 
To  explore  how  bargaining  power  is  influenced  by  observable  exogenous 
characteristics Z, we can parameterize γ: 








                                                       
10  T P , the price that the insurer pays for an episode of inpatient care if the insurer has no 
bargaining power, can also be viewed as the maximum price that can be asked by the 
hospital in case it has monopoly power in the relevant market. This price represents the 
upper bound of the interval of gains from trade between hospital and insurer. We believe 
that the list price in our sample can be a good approximation for this upper bound of the 
gains from trade, since the list price represents the price that can be asked by the hospital 
from a consumer who does not have an option to bargain for a reduced price.  
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If β equals zero, then α equals γ. In this case bargaining power does not vary 
with Z. When γ is zero, perfect competition exists (insurers are able to ex 
tract all rents). When γ is one, the hospital uses monopoly pricing (suppliers 
are able to extract all rents). The Nash bargaining solution is represented by 
a γ of 0.5. 
 
The model (10) resembles the model of Brooks et al (1997). However, they 
estimated  the  absolute  gain  from  bargaining  rather  than  the  relative  gain 
from bargaining, thereby introducing heteroskedasticity, since a larger hospi 
tal with average bargaining power will have both a higher absolute gain and a 
higher  margin.  Moreover,  the  estimation  of  the  empirical  counterparts  to 
equations (8) and (9) require data on contracted prices P, estimates of PL and 
PT,  and  data  on  exogenous  factors,  Z,  that  are  theoretically  related  to  the 
bargaining  power  underlying  each  transaction.  Since  the  bargaining  power 
has to lie within the unit interval, ordinary least squares is an inconsistent es 
timation method and censored regression techniques (such as a Tobit regres 
sion) have to be employed. 
 
For the empirical estimation of the model described by equation (10), we use 
the same covariates as in the estimation of equation (3):  
 
) 11 (            ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln(
) (
) (
hit h i i h
h ht
h hit t d C c D d M b M s a
c l
c p




 Here, we have denoted the list price with lht. 
 
Estimation results for this model are presented in Table 3. 
 
 
5.  Data 
 
5.1. Data-sources 
In this  section, we describe the  various  data  sources that we employed for 
our estimations. Table 1 shows the different sources. 
 
                     [Table 1 about here] 
 
Per DBC, we have three price related components: the average total costs, 
the contracted price, and the list price (i.e. the price that uninsured patients 
and patients from non contracted insurers have to pay). We also have esti 
mates of the associated volumes per DBC.  
 
Because  of  the  administrative  difficulties  associated  with  the  newly  intro 
duced DBC system, many hospitals were not yet able to calculate their own 
average  total  costs.  We  therefore  used  cost  data  from  a  sample  of  12  so 
called "front runner" hospitals to estimate the average cost per DBC.  
 
The DBC volumes in 2004 for the 12 "front runner" hospitals were used to 
translate  the  number  of  outpatient  admissions  in  2004  (an  administrative 
measure  used  in  the  previous  registration  system)  into  estimates  for  the 
DBC volumes in 2005. We currently do not posses the actually realized DBC 
volumes of 2005 or 2006. 
 
Contracted prices were submitted by health insurers. Some smaller insurers 
did not or could not supply all their contracted prices. Since it is hard to dis 
tinguish between DBCs which  were  not contracted  at all and  contracts that 
were closed but not submitted, we cannot make definite statements about the 
coverage of our database. However, from background interviews with hospi 
tals and health insurers (CTG/ZAio, 2005), we learned that in 2005 most in 
surers contracted almost every hospital for their entire range of product. As 
the  10  largest  insurers  submitted  approximately  95%  of  their  contracted 
prices, we estimate to have about 75% of all contract prices in our database.  
Virtually  all  hospitals  complied  with  the  mandatory  supply  of  list  prices  to 
CTG/ZAio. Hospitals are also obliged to post these list prices on publicly ac 
cessible places such as in waiting rooms or on their website. 
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In  principle,  average  total  costs  are  expected  to  be  lower  than  contracted 
prices, which in turn should lie below the list prices. However, in our data 
base, we observe all six possible permutation from the expected pattern. Be 
low cost price contracting (4.5% of our sample) can occur because hospitals 
offer  cost heterogeneous  but  medically  related  DBC packages  for  a  single 
price (e.g. all DBCs related to a single diagnosis). Above list price contracting 
(9.1% of all observations) also occur, possibly because insurers with a small 
but non negligible revenue share might not have enough bargaining power to 
get much of a reduction from the list price. However, they still might want to 
contract the hospital to avoid the expensive administrative task of processing 
insurance claims from individual consumers. These extra administrative costs 
might induce a willingness to pay towards the hospital that lies slightly above 
the  list  price.  Other  explanations  for  such  odd  patterns  in  the  price  data 
might be administrative difficulties with the relatively new DBC system, and 
the inexperience in the bargaining process. 
 
We treat these data problems by performing a multivariate outlier analysis, 
along the  lines of Hadi  (1994) Furthermore, for  the remaining  observations 
with transaction price below cost or above the list price, we use the following 
censoring procedure. When price is below cost, we conclude that the hospital 
has  no  bargaining  power.  When  price  is  above  the  list  price,  including  the 
rather bewildering sequence of list price < contracted price < cost price, we 
conclude that the hospital has all the bargaining power. This is equal to the 
treatment in table 1 of Brooks et al. (1997). Finally, we aggregate the price 
cost margins and bargaining share across all hospital products to an overall 
price cost margin and bargaining. The level of analysis is therefore all 1235 
unique hospital insurers pairs for a period of two years.  
5.2. Market concentration and market shares 
In the near future, as the DBC system will overcome the early administrative 
difficulties,  more  complete  micro level data will  become  available,  including 
cost  prices  from  all  hospitals  and  zipcode  locations  of  patients.  However, 
since  our  current  dataset  does  not  contain  such  micro level  data,  we  were 
unable to  determine  the  relevant product  and geographic  market  from  first 
principles.  
 
On behalf of the Dutch Ministry of Health, a private company (Prismant B.V.) 
performed such a market analysis based on micro level data from the previ 
ous  medical  registration  system  (Prismant,  2004).  There  are  two  important 
dimensions  for  the  relevant  market:  the  product  market  definition  and  the 
geographic  market  definition.  Prismant  distinguishes  the  following  product 
markets for hospital care: 
·  Acute care versus elective care 
·  Inpatient care versus outpatient care 
·  Uncomplicated care versus complicated care 
The competitive segment in 2005 is restricted to uncomplicated, elective out 
patient care.  
   
We  used  published  market  share  data  based  on  patient  flows  (Elzinga 
Hogarty (EH) test (Prismant, 2004)).
11 This test takes a geographic market to 
be the area in which most citizens consume locally produced healthcare, and 
where locally produced healthcare is also mostly consumed by local citizens. 
The determination of geographic market by the EH test have been subject to 
a lot of research and debate. For an overview of the method and the debate, 
we refer to Gaynor and Vogt (2003) and to the FTC/DOJ report (2004). 
 
The results from the Prismant analysis include for every hospital in our data 
base a list of hospitals that are in the same geographic market, and for all 
these hospitals their market share in the relevant product market of uncom 
plicated,  elective  outpatient  care.  The  resulting  market  shares  have  been 
used to compute the Herfindahl Hirschman Index of market concentration for 
each geographic hospital market. 
                                                       
11 Their analysis is based on micro level data from the previous medical registration and 
performed for different product markets. We used the analysis for uncomplicated, elective, 
outpatient care products. The Prismant analysis is based on patient locations indexed by 
zipcode areas. For some metropolitan areas, we had to correct these results for adjacent 
hospitals located in the same zipcode area, which would otherwise result in completely 
overlapping geographic markets.  
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From another private data source (Vektis, 2004) we obtain the national mar 
ket  shares of health  insurers. From  this, we could in  principle compute  the 
HHI for the national market for health insurance. However, in our application 
we do not study the health insurance market per se (where insurers compete 
for  consumers),  but  rather  the  health  contracting  market  (where  hospitals 
compete for insurers). We therefore need to compute the market share of in 
surers in contracted health care in each geographic hospital market. 
 
The distribution of contracted health care per hospital over the various health 
insurers is obtained from a database by CTZ. This dataset contains the num 
ber  of  nursing  days  per  hospital  each  insurer  bought  in  the  regulated  seg 
ment. Assuming that the relative shares of insurers per hospital are the same 
in the  competitive segment, we computed the relative shares of insurers  in 
the  estimated  DBC volumes  obtained  from  the  first  data  source  in  table  1, 
and subsequently the HHI of insurers within the geographic hospital market. 
 
All in all, we have the following variable indicating market concentration and 
market share: 
·  the HHI of hospitals in the relevant market 
·  the HHI of insurers in the relevant market. 
·  the centered market share of a hospital in the relevant market. 
·  the centered market share of an insurer in the relevant market. 
 
In our models, we simultaneously include the HHI and the market share of 
hospitals and insurers. To avoid problems with multicollinearity, we first cen 
ter the market shares towards a zero mean by substracting the HHI.  
 
Following Melnick et al. (1992), we also interact market share with concen 
tration to capture possible diminishing effects of competing firms on a given 
firms market power. We construct 4 dummy variables which divide the HHI 
along the levels of 2,000; 3,333; and 5,000. 
   
5.3  Control variables 
From our basic database, we construct the following demand and cost shift 
ers. To capture demand shifters, we construct indicators for the relative im 
portance of the competitive segment for a specific hospital or insurer. For a 
hospitals, this is calculated as the ratio between the revenue of the competi 
tive segment and the regulated segment. For insurers, this  is calculated  as 
the revenue of the insurer in a local hospital market compared to its national 
turnover.  We  also  include  dummies  labelling  the  different  geographic  areas 
(provinces), and we finally also include a dummy to capture possible time ef 
fects. To avoid the basic dummy variable trap, we use the general hospitals, 
the province  of Zuid Holland and  the  year 2005  as  the  reference  groups  in 
the regressions. 
 
As cost shifters we include the following variables. First, we include dummies 
for hospital type (general hospitals, tertiary care hospitals and teaching hos 
pitals). Second, we compute a proxy for casemix of the hospital production. 
Normally, a casemix index is created by calculating the ratio between (total) 
expenditures and the number of patients. Since we do not have data on the 
number of patients  in the  competitive segment,  we first calculated the unit 
cost of an average DBC as the ratio between the aggregate DBC expenditures 
(DBC volumes priced and average unit cost) and the aggregate DBC volume, 
and index this variable such that the national average is 100. We also con 
struct  size  indicators  that  might  capture  economies  of  scale  for  a  specific 
hospital or insurer. For a hospitals, this is calculated as total the revenue of 
the competitive and regulated segment combined. For insurers, this is calcu 
lated as its national total of nursing days.  
 
We log transformed most of our continuous variables (except for the bargain 
ing share, the casemix index and the importance measures) since preliminary 
regressions indicated that the residuals were characterized by a very skewed 
distribution. 
6.  Estimation Results 
 
6.1 Estimation of the SCP-model 
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As a performance measure in the SCP model, we use a price mark up derived 
from the price and cost data as a ratio of list price less estimated costs to list 
price. See Table 2 that provides an overview of descriptive statistics. The av 
erage price cost margin in our sample was 6,5%. Descriptive statistics of the 
dependent  variables  and  explanatory  variables  that  have  been  discussed  in 
section 5.2 are also provided in Table 2.  
 
                   [Table 2 about here] 
 
For the estimation of the SCP model, we regressed price cost margins on in 
dicators of industry performance and on the set of explanatory variables us 
ing  OLS  regression.  The  estimation  results  are  summarized  in  the  column 
Model I of Table 3. The model explains 28% of the variation of the price cost 




                   [Table 3 about here] 
 
The model also indicates that the concentration measures have the expected 
signs since the concentration of hospitals (insurers) has a significant positive 
(negative) impact on the price cost mark up that hospitals are able to charge 
for their products in the competitive domain. The magnitude of the impact of 
an increased HHI on the price cost margin however is about an order of mag 
nitude smaller than the results in Melnick et al. (1992). Furthermore, teach 
ing hospitals are able to charge significantly higher price cost margins than 
general hospitals, as they get about 14% higher mark ups than general hos 
pitals. See Table 3. 
 
Interestingly, the coefficients for the HHI on the hospital's and insurer's mar 
ket are almost identical to the coefficients for their centered market shares. 
This means that the net impact of the HHI on either side of the market is not 
significantly different from zero.
13 As we conjectured in section 4, this might 
indicate that there is no coordinated market power present in our data set. 
Intuitively, the estimation results suggests that only unilateral market power 
is being exercised since higher market shares rather than a higher HHI influ 
ence  the  price cost  margins.  It  would  be  interesting  for  future  research  to 
construct  more  structural  models  that  can  distinguish  between  coordinated 
and unilateral market power. 
 
Since our results indicate that market structure has only weak (though sig 
nificant) impact on price cost margins in the competitive segment of hospital 
care,  the  implications  for  the  welfare  effects  of  e.g.  hospital  or  insurers 
mergers  are  to  be  interpreted  rather  carefully.  For  a  merger  of  2  out  of  5 
equally  sized hospitals (insurers), we predict a  modest 1,5% price increase 
(decrease), whereas the predicted price cost difference for a merger of 2 out 
of 3 equally sized market parties would amount to about 1,8%.  
 
6.2 Estimation of the hospital-insurer bargaining model 
 
For estimation of hospital insurer bargaining model we constructed a depend 
ent variable denoting the bargaining share of the hospital. It is defined as the 
relative location of the contracted price on the interval between the estimated 
cost price and the list price for non insured consumers. In other words, it is 
determined as a fraction of the total gains from trade between hospitals and 
insures that goes to hospitals. The average share a hospital gets from the to 
tal  gains  of  trade  is  47%.  See  Table  2  (Descriptive  Statistics).  This  would 
mean, that on average the insurers have slightly more bargaining power, if 
we can reject the hypothesis that hospitals and insurers reach the Nash bar 
gaining solution of 0.5 (see section 4.3 for theoretical background). Following 
a formal t test based on our data, we reject the hypothesis that hospitals and 
insurers reached a Nash bargaining solution. 
 
It should also be stressed that this dependent variable is limited between 0 
and 1 by construction (see section 5). This structure of the dependent vari 
able  calls  for  application  of  limited  dependent  variable  econometric  tech 
niques,  rather  than  the  ordinary  least  squares  techniques  of  Brooks  et  al. 
                                                       
12 As was done by Melnick et al. (1992). 
13 In a regression with on the RHS b1 * HHI + b2 * (market share – HHI), the net impact of 
the HHI is (b1– b2) * HHI. In our estimation, b1 does not significantly differ from b2, so the 
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(1997).  The  hospital insurer  bargaining  model  is  estimated  using  the  cen 
sored regression Tobit model. We report the estimation results for hospital 
insurer bargaining model in the column Model II in Table 3. 
 
From these results, we conclude that a higher concentration of the HHI of in 
surers leads to a significant increase in the insurer's bargaining share. This 
impact of insurer concentration is purely picked up by the insurers HHI, with 
no significant coefficient for the centered market share. This would suggest 
that insurers bargain in a somewhat coordinated way with hospitals since a 
higher HHI on the insurer market leads to a higher bargaining share for the 
insurers. 
 
For hospitals, however, only the centered market share has a significant coef 
ficient, but with a negative sign. We interpret this as follows. The net coeffi 
cient  of  the  hospital  HHI  is  significantly  positive.  This  would  suggest  that 
hospitals also coordinate their bargaining with insurers. However, this coordi 
nated bargaining power is significantly adjusted downward by the hospital's 
own market share. This is consistent with the fact that smaller hospitals profit 
more from the coordinated bargaining that larger hospitals. 
 
On average, teaching hospitals are able to obtain a better market outcome as 
they get about 17% more of the bargaining share than general hospitals. But 
the regression coefficient for the teaching dummy is not significant. This im 
plies that although academic hospitals are able to charge significantly higher 
prices,  they  do  bargain  not  significantly  better  compared  to  other  types  of 
hospitals. 
 
6.3 Estimation of idiosyncratic effects in the bargaining process 
 
As Melnick et al. observe based on papers describing the situation in Califor 
nia  just  after  the  introduction  of  competition  in  hospital  care,  the  market 
might not  be  in  a  long run  equilibrium. This  suggests that  idiosyncratic  ef 
fects might have a sizeable impact on the market outcomes. However, direct 
inclusion of fixed effects per hospital and  insurer in our model did not im 
prove  our  initial  estimation  results  (because  of  the  severe  reduction  in  de 
grees of freedom). To test this hypothesis, we therefore performed an ANOVA 
analysis on the residuals of our initial regression.  See Table 4.  
 
                   [Table 4 about here] 
 
We find that in the SCP model approximately 28% of the residual variation 
can be explained by idiosyncratic effects of the individual hospitals and insur 
ers, 11% by insurer specific effects and 17% by hospital specific effects.  
 
We also perform an ANOVA analysis on the residuals of our initial regression. 
See Table 4. We find that approximately 41% of the residual variation of the 
bargaining  model  can be  explained by  idiosyncratic effects, 12% by insurer 
specific effects and 29% by hospital specific effects.  
 
7. Conclusion 
In this paper we estimate the impact of concentration and bargaining power 
on the negotiation results in the first two years after the institutional change 
in  the  Dutch  hospital  sector.  First,  we  use  a  traditional  Structure Conduct 
Performance  model  (SCP model)  along the  lines of Melnick  et  al. (1992)  to 
estimate  the  effects  of  buyer  and  seller  concentration  on  price  mark ups. 
Second, we model the interaction between hospitals and insurers in the con 
text  of  a  generalized  bargaining  model  (Brooks  et  al.,  1997).  In  the  SCP 
model, we obtain that the concentration of hospitals (insurers) has a signifi 
cantly positive (negative) impact on hospital price cost margin.  
 
The magnitude  of  the  impact  of an  increased  HHI  on  the price cost  margin 
however is about an order of magnitude smaller than the results in Melnick et 
al. (1992). Furthermore, teaching hospitals are able to charge a significantly 
higher  price cost  margins  than  general  hospitals  as  they  get  about  14% 
higher mark ups than general hospitals. 
 
In the bargaining model, we also find a significant negative effect of insurer 
concentration  on  the  bargaining  share,  but  no  significant  effect  of  hospital 
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a hospital gets from the total gains of trade is 47%. This would mean, that on 
average the insurers have slightly more bargaining power, since we can not 
reject the hypothesis that hospitals and insurers reached a Nash bargaining 
solution.  Academic  hospitals  again  are  able  to  charge  significantly  higher 
prices, but they do not significantly better bargain, compared to other types 
of hospitals. 
 
In  both  models  we  find  a  significant  impact  of  idiosyncratic  effects  on  the 
market outcomes, consistent with the fact that the Dutch  hospital sector is 
not yet in a long run equilibrium. 
 
Since our results indicate that market structure has only weak (though sig 
nificant) impact on price cost margins in the competitive segment of hospital 
care,  the  implications  for  the  welfare  effects  of  e.g.  hospital  or  insurers 
mergers are to be interpreted rather carefully. 
 
Our results from the SCP model seem to indicate that the negotiations were 
not coordinated between both the hospitals and insurers. However, the bar 
gaining  model  suggests  that  some  coordination  between both hospitals and 
insurers. Our estimated models do not allow us to draw any hard conclusions 
on the distinction between coordinated and unilateral effects. 
 
We expect to have more and better data in the near future. Especially we ex 
pect to gather data on the treatment volumes and patient level data (some 
characteristics like sex, age, diagnosis and zip code), which will allow us to 
extend the estimated models along the lines of Capps et al. (2003) and Antwi 
et al. (2006). These approaches will allow us to estimate a structural model 
of hospital competition.  These structural models might also allow us to dis 
tinguish between coordination and unilateral market power. 
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Table 1: Data sources that were employed for estimations 
Information  Source 
(years) 
Remarks 
Estimated  cost 
prices  and  vol 
umes  per  DBC  in 




Information  submitted 
by  a  sample  of  12 
hospitals.  The  associ 
ated  revenues  have 
been  subtracted  from 
the  hospital  budgets 
in  the  regulated  seg 
ment  





Information  submitted 
by  health  insurers 
(coverage 75%  of  the 
national market) 
List prices per DBC  CTG/ZAio 
(2005, 
2006) 
Information  submitted 
by  hospitals  (almost 
complete coverage) 
Relevant  geo 
graphic  markets 




Elzinga Hogarty  test 
applied  to  hospital 
and  patient  zipcode 
locations 
National  market 




Information  submitted 
by  health  insurers  for 
the  risk  adjustment 
system 
Mutual  shares  of 
hospitals  and  in 
surers  in  each 




Based  on  the  number 
of  nursing  days 
bought  by  the  public 
health  insurers,  re 
scaled  to  include  pri 

















Price-cost markup  1.065  0.052  0.832  1.351 
Hospital's bargaining share  0.474  0.293  0.000  1.000 
HHI hospitals  0.250  0.156  0.071  0.914 
HHI insurers  0.466  0.149  0.241  0.812 
market share hospital  0.267  0.191  0.022  0.956 
market share insurer  0.013  0.044  0.000  0.760 
relative importance for hospital  0.117  0.020  0.055  0.167 
relative importance for insurer  0.049  0.116  0.000  0.862 
hospital size  0.866  0.473  0.301  2.183 
insurer size  1.391  0.942  0.080  3.130 








                                                       
14 CTZ was the Health Insurers Regulator and merged in October 2006 with 
CTG/ZAio into the Dutch Healthcare Authority. 
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 Table 3 - Estimation results 
  Model I  Model II 
  Coefficient  Std. Error  Coefficient  Std. Error 
HHI hospitals  0.015*  0.005  -0.048  0.037 
HHI insurers  -0.015***  0.008  -0.115***  0.061 
centered market share hospital  0.014*  0.004  -0.115*  0.032 
centered market share insurer  -0.014*  0.005  0.033  0.035 
interaction of hospital's market 
share in local market 
       
with HHI hospitals (<0.2)  -0.009**  0.004  0.050***  0.030 
with HHI hospitals (0.2-0.33)  -0.007  0.004  0.048  0.033 
with HHI hospitals (0.33-0.5)  -0.003  0.005  0.078**  0.039 
interaction of insurer's market 
share in local market 
       
with HHI insurers (0.2-0.33)  0.004  0.005  -0.083**  0.034 
with HHI insurers (0.33-0.5)  0.003  0.005  -0.108*  0.035 
with HHI insurers (>0.5)  0.005  0.005  -0.103*  0.036 
relative importance for hospital  -0.249*  0.087  -0.454  0.643 
relative importance for insurer  0.036**  0.014  0.285*  0.106 
hospital size  -0.005  0.005  0.042  0.038 
insurer size  0.013*  0.002  0.076*  0.013 
teaching hospital  0.137*  0.014  0.166  0.102 
tertiary care  0.002  0.005  0.054  0.034 
casemix index  0.140***  0.072  -0.501  0.527 
regional dummies         
Groningen  -0.001  0.007  -0.111**  0.052 
Friesland  0.036*  0.007  0.166*  0.053 
Drenthe  -0.013**  0.006  0.172*  0.048 
Overijssel  -0.006  0.006  -0.120*  0.046 
Gelderland  0.022*  0.005  0.019  0.037 
Limburg  -0.020*  0.006  0.116*  0.045 
Noord-Holland  -0.004  0.004  0.013  0.031 
Utrecht  -0.012***  0.007  0.116**  0.051 
Noord-Brabant  0.010**  0.005  0.049  0.034 
Zeeland  -0.006  0.008  -0.044  0.059 
Flevoland  0.020**  0.009  0.317*  0.070 
year==2005  -0.016*  0.002  -0.084*  0.018 
constant  -0.165  0.141  -1.208  1.032 
Adjusted R2  0.28       
Pseudo R2      0.29   
 
Table 4 – Idiosyncratic effects in the residual variance  
  Model I  Model II 
idiosyncratic effects in the  
residual variance (ANOVA R2) 
  hospital 
effects 
  hospital 
effects 
    0.17    0.29 
insurer effects  0.11  0.28  0.12  0.41 
 